The new law on infringement of registered trade marks in the United Kingdom: Early developments by LLEWELYN, David
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection School Of Law School of Law
8-1996
The new law on infringement of registered trade
marks in the United Kingdom: Early developments
David LLEWELYN
Singapore Management University, dllewelyn@smu.edu.sg
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sol_research
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons
This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School Of Law by an authorized administrator of Institutional Knowledge at Singapore
Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
LLEWELYN, David. The new law on infringement of registered trade marks in the United Kingdom: Early developments. (1996).
Published in Australian Intellectual Property Journal. 7, 149-160. Research Collection School Of Law.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sol_research/2432
The New Law on Infringement of Registered 
Trade Marks in the United Kingdom: 
Early Developments 
David Llewelyn 
Partner, Llewelyn Zietman Solicitors, London; Senior Visiting Fellow in Intellectual Property Law, 
Centre for Commercial Law Studies, Queen Mary & Westfield College, London 
In this article the author considers the infringement provisions ofthe Trade Marks Act 1994 
(UK) and a number of recent decisions in which they have been considered. 
Introduction Trade Marks Act, a mark which functioned in the 
Since the introduction in the United Kingdom of a marketplace to indicate origin might only be capable 
system for the registration of trade marks in the 1880s, o f b e i n S P r o t e c t e d t h r o u g h a Ρ 8 8 8 " « o f f a c t l o n · P a s s m § 
the scope of protection afforded to such intellectual o f f a c t i o n s a r e expensive: (1) the plaintiff must 
property rights has been limited. Where a trade mark e s t a b l i s h t h a t t h e m a r k r e a l ' y d ° e * i n d l ^ a t e h , m 0T^r 
registered for particular goods or services was used a s t h e o r i g i n o f t h e P r ° d u , c t s ' <?> c
u
0 n f i l s l 0 n
 «
 o f t e n 
without authorisation on other goods or services, the extremely difficult to find or, in the case of a pre-
owner o f t h e registered right was forced to rely on the e m P t i v e 3 P P 1 " ^ 1 0 " for ^ interlocutory injunction, 
law of passing off with all its attendant uncertainties: a n t l c l P a t e a n d ^ . d a m a f , s n o t o " o u ; ^ d l f f i c u l t t 0 
,, A4- A-u e - AA show and/or predict without considerable expense to 
the need to prove goodwill, confusion and damage. , , , , . , , , . . 
wru-i +u · Ì A · ι pay both legal advisers and the ubiquitous market 
While the e c o n o m i c value and c o m m e r c i a l F * f M 
importance of trade marks has increased considerably, S U ™ e y !P^CJlf.1 S S'. ,
 T T . x. r- ^ , 
, , J 1 Γ . . A 4- Α ι · 4-u IT -4. A The EC Directive on the Harmonisation of Trade 
the law of reg is tered t rade marks in the Uni ted ^ 1 1 Γ , , TT . , „ . , ^ 1 . 
^ · , - , 4.A- 4-u 4 - 1 Marks has now forced the United Kingdom to bring 
K i n g d o m r e m a i n e d rooted in the conceptua l . ,
 n
 . , , , , f . . 
. . . 4T^ u ι 4. 1H4.U 4. r^ A 4. A its law of registered trade marks up to date, to recognise 
underpinnings of the late 19th century. Today trade
 t t. . . . - ,, ,5 · \ c 
, A \4. - Α ι ν A i-i 4^u market realities in the field and to give the owners of 
m a r k s are dealt in and exploi ted like any other . ,
 c
 . ,
 A f. A, ·. ·, 
,., Λ 4. Α Α Λ A /u .u -,u A registered marks far broader protection than sits easily 
c o m m o d i t y : they are traded, sold (both with and P 1 1 ,. . ir> -^- u,u - u 4, u 4, 4, A 
.., . ., . 4. A u - x A .u with the traditional British theories about what a trade 
without their associated business), and others are . . 
authorised to use them by their owner. United Kingdom - " , . . , ,
 J i n n / 1 , 1 U U , , 
ι u u A A-rr ,4, · · 4. 4. vu .u- The Trade Marks Act\994 changes all that: or does 
law has had difficulty in coming to terms with this, as 
can be seen from the "trafficking" provision in the 1938 
Act (the inconvenience of which was shown clearly in Ease of registration 
the Holly Robbie decision o f t h e House of Lords 1 in 
which the coherence o f t h e system of trade mark law T h e a i m o f t h e Directive and hence the 1994 Trade 
was allowed to prevail over commercial reality). Marks A c t i n t h e U n i t e d K i n S d o m 1S t 0 m a k e * e a s i e r 
As Corni sh p o i n t e d out 2 in a c o m m e n t on the t 0 o b t a i n registered trade mark rights than it had been 
coloured capsule case, Smith Kline & French >s Trade Previously in the United Kingdom. As can be seen from 
Mark Application * it was absurd that under the 1938 t h e formalistic application o f t h e 1938 Act by the 
House of Lords in the "Coca-Cola " Trade Mark case, 
—— the onus was on the applicant under the old regime to 
1 [1984] 3 Ch 420. 
2 [1974] JBL 250. 
3 [1989] FSR 11. 4 [1986] RPC 421. 
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justify why a registration should be granted: the quasi- (a) by the use of an identical mark in relation to goods 
monopoly right inherent in a trade mark registration or services identical to those for which the mark 
had to be earned and justified by the applicant, the is registered; 
Registrar would not assume it. (b) where there exists a likelihood of confusion (which 
The onus has now shifted: it is up to the Trade Marks includes a likelihood of association) on the part 
Office to show why a particular mark should not be ofthe public because there has been use ofa mark 
registered: "If a sign functions in the marketplace as a which is identical with the registered mark and is 
trade mark, it is to be regarded as a trade mark."5 The used in relation to goods or services similar to 
assumptions of over 100 years of registered trade mark those for which the trade mark is registered, or a 
law in the United Kingdom have been altered: similar mark is used in relation to identical or 
obtaining a registration should not be like passing similar goods or services to those for which the 
through the eye of a needle, it should be available mark is registered; 
unless excluded by the 1994 Act. (c) wr iere the registered mark has a reputation in the 
This means that there should be far more
 U n i t e d Kingdom and the unauthorised use ofthe 
registrations than at present and third parties are going
 m a r k « t a k e s u nf a i r advantage of, or is detrimental 
to have to be more careful. However, the cautionary
 t 0? t h e distinctive character or the repute of the 
comments of Laddie J in the Mercury6 case on the need
 t r a d e m a r k » w h e r e t h e u s e i s o f a m a r k w h i c h j s 
to avoid broad specifications (such as for computer identical or similar to the registered mark and it 
software, in the particular case) should be borne in
 h a s b e e n u s e d i n relation to goods or services 
mind.7 Indeed, the Registry's practice frequently
 w h ¡ c h a r e not s i m i l a r t 0 t h o s e f o r w h i c h t h e m a r k 
requires evidence that a mark is already distinctive in -
 reeistered* and/or 
the marketplace rather than accepting that it is merely
 ( d ) w h e r e t h e r e ' h a s b e e n u s e o f a m a r k identical or 
"capable of distinguishing", the test in s 1(1) of the similar to a mark which, whether registered in the 
Apt 8 ' ° 
^
1 ,
 United Kingdom or not, is entitled to protection 
But once the registration is obtained, what rights
 u n d e r ^ 6 b i s o f fte P a H s C o n v e n t i o n a s a w e i l 
does it accord its proprietor?
 k n o w n t r a d e ^ ¡n r e l a t i o n t 0 i d e n t i c a l o r s i m i l a r 
Infringement g o o d s o r s e rv i ce s> P r o v i d ed the use is likely to 
cause confusion. 
Under the new Act, infringement can occur in four 
w ayS : Use ofa mark other than by graphic representation 
can now constitute infringement,9 for example by a 
door-to-door salesman. 
5 Department of Trade and Industry, Reform of Trade Mark 
Law, Cmnd 1203 (Sept 1990), ρ 7. 
6 Mercury Communications Ltd ν Mercury Interactive (VK) ΐ Γ ^ Ο β ΓΓΙίϊΓΚ USC 
Ltd [1995] FSR 850. 
7 "In my view the defining characteristic ofa piece of computer U n d e r S 4 o f t h e 1938 Act it was held that the use 
software is not the medium on which it is recorded, nor the fact
 b y t h e defendant of a mark had to be "trade mark use" 
that it controls the computer, nor the trade channels through which , _ , . . . . ^ . 4 . · » ^ 
it passes but the function it performs. A piece of software which be fore t h e r e c o u l d be i n f r i n g e m e n t : in Mars ν 
enables a computer to behave like a flight simulator is an entirely Cadbury]0 the phrase " T r e a t S i z e " was held not to be 
different product to software which, say, enables a computer to
 u s e d ¡ n a t r a d e m a r R b u t r a t h e r i n a descript ive sense 
optically character read text or design a chemical factory. In my . . . 
view it is thoroughly undesirable that a trader who is interested in and therefore did not infringe the plaintiff s registration 
one limited area of computer software should, by registration, obtain for " n o n - m e d i c a t e d con fec t i one ry c o n t a i n i n g 
a statutory monopoly of indefinite duration covering all types of
 c n o c o i a t e » o f t h e w o r d "Treets". Similarly, in 
soltware, including those which are far removed from its own area . J 
of trading interest... I understand that similar wide specifications Mothercare UKv Penguin Books]] Dillon LJ Stated: 
of goods may not be possible under the 1994 Act": per Laddie J 
(ibid at 865). 
8 David Minto, Trade Marks counsel at Nestlé UK, has stated 
"having trumpeted the novelty ofthe new Act, the Registry all too 9 Section 103(2). 
often apply traditional criteria in dealing with applications": 10 [1987] RPC 387. 
Commercial Lawyer, December/January 1996, ρ 33. 11 [1987] RPC 113. 
150 AUSTRALIAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY JOURNAL — Volume 7 
The New Law on Infringement of Registered Trade Marks in the United Kingdom 
"Indeed it stands to reason that a Trade Marks Act Similarly, the judge did not consider it relevant to 
would only be concerned to restrict the use of a take into account what the White Paper Reform of 
mark as a trade mark or in a trade mark sense, and Trade Mark Law™ had to say on the point, 
should be construed accordingly. If descriptive Commenting on the Wet Wet Wet decision, Jacob J 
words are legitimately registered in Part A ofthe said that Wet Wet Wet was being used in the title of 
register, there is still no reason why other people the book simply to refer to the pop group and therefore 
should not be free to use the words in a descriptive was not being used in relation to goods covered by 
sense ..."'
2
 the registration, as required by both s 10(1) and (2). In 
this connection, he noted that the circumstances of a 
In Bravado Merchandising Services ν Mainstream
 p a r t i c u l a r u s e a n d a n y added matter is relevant to the 
Publishing," the Outer House ofthe Court of Session
 q u e s t i o n whether the mark is being used in relation to 
in Scotland had to consider whether the owner ofthe particular goods or services 
trade mark Wet Wet Wet registered for books could On the question of whether s 10 requires trade mark 
stop the use ofthe title A Sweet Little Mystery — Wet
 use
^
 t h e j u d g e referred to s 9(1), which sets out the 
Wet Wet — the Inside Story for a book about the pop exclusive rights ofthe owner ofa registered trade mark 
group Wet Wet Wet. Unfortunately, it was conceded
 a n d states that these are infringed by the use ofthe 
by counsel for the plaintiff that in order to fall within
 t r a d e mark without consent. On the other hand, in s 10 
s 10 the use complained of must be use in a trade mark
 m e
 use by the third party is of a "sign". His Lordship 
sense. The judge, Lord McCluskey, referred to the considered that s 9(1): 
statement by Lord Strathclyde, Minister of State at the 
Department of Trade and Industry, during the passage " I s r e a l l y n o m o r e t h a n a chatty introduction to the 
ofthe Trade Marks Bill: d e t a i l s s e t o u t i n s 1 0 ' l t s e l f a d d i n S n o m o r e t h a n 
that the act concerned must be done without consent 
"As a matter of general trade mark law it is implicit ... For reasons which baffle me the Parliamentary 
that use of a registered trade mark must be trade draftsman did not simply copy [Art 5). He set out 
mark use in order that the rights given by the Bill about re-writing it. So s 9( 1 ) has no exact equivalent 
may be enforced."14 in Art 5 ... The words in s 9(1), by the use ofthe 
trade mark, are not in the Directive and the 
However, in the British Sugar decision,15 Jacob J suggested gloss, which depends on these words, 
did not consider it permissible to refer to statements
 c o u
l d not apply to the Directive so the argument 
in Parliament to assist in resolving any ambiguity based on s 9(1) involves a departure from the 
stemming from the terms of the Approximation Directive. This is wholly improbable. I reject it." 
Directive 16 itself. 
However, although on this analysis the use by a third 
"What matters is the language ofthe Directive. That party in a descriptive sense of a registered mark would 
is why it is so important that those responsible for fall within s 10. It would be saved by the exceptions in 
this kind of legislation make serious efforts to be s 11(2).19 
clear. If they are not then the process of litigation 
imposed on industry will ensure an ultimate cost to 
the public ofthe Union."17 18 Q P c ¡ t n 5 
19 "A registered trade mark is not infringed by 
(a) the use by a person of his own name or address, 
(b) the use of indications concerning the kind, quality, 
12 Ibid at 118, quantity, intended purpose, value, geographical origin, 
13 [1996] FSR 205. the entire production of goods or a rendering of services, 
14 Hansard, HL, Vol 532, col 773. or other characteristics of goods or services, or 
15 British Sugar ν James Robertson & Sons (unreported, ChD, (c) the use of a trade mark where it is necessary to indicate 
7 February 1996). the intended purpose of a product or service (in 
16 First Council Directive of 21 December 1988 to approximate particular, as accessories or spare parts) 
the laws ofthe Member States relating to trade marks, OJ No L40/ provided the use is in accordance with honest practices in 
1, 11.2.89. industrial or commercial matters." (See also Art 6 ofthe 
17 British Sugar (unreported, ChD, 7 February 1996). Directive.) 
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In essence, the only consequence ofthe use falling the jar for the toffee spread stated that it was "delicious 
within s 10 but being excluded from infringement by at breakfast, with desserts or as a snack anytime", his 
s 11 is the fact that the burden of satisfying the court Lordship found that it was not a dessert sauce, relying 
that the use should benefit from s 11 lies on the especially on evidence that all possible uses of the 
defendant rather than the plaintiff. In this connection, product other than as a spread amounted to less than 5 
as noted by the judge, the whole context ofthe use per cent of volume: 
must be taken into account:
 ££__n . ^ _ . A A- , A 
When it comes to construing a word used in a trade 
"The most important thing of all must be my own mark specification, one is concerned with how the 
impression from the label and all the surrounding product is, as a practical matter, regarded for the 
circumstances. Looking at the label I think the purposes of trade."24 
average customer would not see 'Treat' used as a
 TT ,. . T , , . _ , x, _, , c Λ „ c u 
x
 ,
 ö
 . _ . . . . . ,, Had his Lordship found that the defendant s use fell 
trade mark. It is true that it is written as part of a ._ . _ , -r- .· r A - . r u- u 
ι
 t r r f f ^ , , , . . , . within the classification of goods in respect of which 
phrase Toffee Treat but this is done in a context . . . ._, , r\ , , ., ,,, , 
. , .
 Λ
 .
 Ύ
 .
 n
 . the plaintiff s mark was registered, he considered that 
where the maker s name is plain. It is of course the . ,, _ . ™ Jr __
 r
, , , , , ., 
, , , the use of the sign Treat as part ofthe defendant s 
case that you can have two trade marks used .
 iCT^  . _ , _ ~ ^ ,„ , , , , <, 4.1 , / An r Λ ι i i , ι mark "Robertson's Toffee Treat would have been the 
together (Ford Prefect), but whether the secondary _ ., . , ,
 A ,, , - 4 . , / ^ ^ , 
,. , , , . .
 f f ΤΓ use of an identical mark to that registered (Treat) by 
word is used as a trade mark is a question of fact. If . . . .~
 ¥ A, , ,, , Λ ^ . + . 
. . J 1 , . , . . Δ . the plaintiff. In other words, the absolute statutory it is a fancy word, then obviously it is a trade mark /
 A. , , ^ ,, , , 
. . ι J , ι , · I T ^ protection accorded to registered trade marks remains because it could not be taken as anything else. But , .
 1 Λ Λ . A A , 
. . , . , , , . · τ , under the 1994 Act and: 
where it is highly descriptive I see no reason why a 
member ofthe public should take the matter as a "Once a mark is shown to offend the user of it 
badge of origin."20 cannot escape by showing that by something outside 
^ 1 . , , , , ., ο, , the actual mark itself he distinguishes his goods The iudge was not persuaded by evidence21 that _ _ ¿-^ - , A -4. »25 i 1 J r A , , ·_. A ^ nc from those ofthe registered proprietor. 25 
some ofthe defendant s employees considered Toffee 
Treat" as a "brand" and even if that had been their Jacob J referred to his earlier decision in the Origins 
intention he considered it had not necessarily case,26 in which he stated that s 10: 
succeeded 
"requires the court to assume the mark of the 
T, _.
 Ί Ί
 - j . · / 7 . plaintiff is used in a normal and fair manner in 
Identical mark on identical goods or services K
 w
. , , ~ ,. , . . . . . , ,+u _ 
0
 relation to goods for which it is registered and then 
Section 10(1) provides for the most obvious case to assess a likelihood of confusion in relation to 
of infringement ofa registered mark. This is classical the way the defendant uses its mark, discounting 
trade mark infringement as it has been known in the added matter or circumstances." 
United Kingdom since 1883. It should, however, be ^ ,, r.™ .„ , ·
 T A U~ „ ~„+~A. 
,
 Λ
 &
 „ , , . , , , , On the use of Treat , his Lordship commented: 
noted that any use ofthe mark is caught, whether by 
graphical representation or otherwise, including by oral "one still has to identify the defendant's sign for 
use.
22
 the purposes ofthe comparison. In most cases there 
In British Sugar™ Jacob J considered whether the could be no difficulty. It is either there or not. 
defendant's "toffee flavoured spread" fell within the However, it is possible for the sign to be hidden or 
plaintiff's specification of goods, "dessert sauces and swamped. No-one but a crossword fanatic, for 
syrups". Despite the fact that the label on the back of example, would say that 'treat' is present in 'theatre 
20 British Sugar (unreported, ChD, 7 February 1996). 24 Ibid. Jacob J also referred to the fact that it was the Registrar's 
21 One of the defendant's witnesses accepted that the design view that the defendant's product fell within Cl 29 rather than Cl 
objective was "to establish 'Toffee Treat' as a prominent product/ 30 in which the plaintiff's mark was registered. 
brand name in its own right". 25 Per Sir Wilfred Greene MR in Saville Perfumery ν Woolworth 
22 Section 103(2). (1939) 43 RPC 147 at 161. 
23 Unreported, ChD, 7 February 1996. 26 [1995] FSR 280 at 284. 
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atmosphere'. There is no question of this sort here, independent of the particular mark the subject of 
however. 'Treat' is there on the [defendant's] registration or the defendant's sign." 
p
 ' This paragraph of the judgment is critical: it 
In Bravado Merchandising1 Lord McCluskey did indicates clearly that the judge considered s 10(2) to 
not regard the actual typeface in which a particular be limited to objective similarity between the goods, 
word mark was registered to be an integral part ofthe regardless ofthe strength ofthe particular mark used 
mark unless there was a clear indication to such effect.28 by the plaintiff. Rather, the owner of a "strong" mark 
Although he expressed himself puzzled by the fact will be able to avail himself of the extended protection 
that one ofthe two marks in issue consisted ofthe under s 10(3) which may not be available to the owner 
words "Wet Wet Wet" underlined in a distinctive way, of a "weak" or "unused" mark. Thus, it can be seen 
he did not consider that this limited the registration to that there is being developed a hierarchy for protection 
that particular formulation.29 of registered marks: the mark which has been merely 
registered but has not been used (and therefore has 
Similar mark or similar goods not developed any form of reputation) will only be 
Section 10(2) goes much further and provides that protected against use on a relatively narrow range of 
it is infringement ofa registered trade mark for a third goods, the goods or services covered by the 
party to use a mark: specification and a "penumbra" around it. On the other 
hand, a registered mark which has been used on a 
(i) "identical with the trade mark ... in relation to
 s i g n i f l c a n t s c a l e will be protected against use on 
goodsorservicessimilarto those for which a trade
 dissimilar g o o d s o r services. It is suggested that this 
mark is registered" or ¡s a sensjbie ^ d coherent way of approaching the scope 
(ii) "similar to the trade mark ... in relation to goods
 o f p r o t e c t i o n u n d e r the new Act, although it has its 
or services identical with or similar to those for
 c r j t i c s w h o c o n s i d e r t h a t s 1 0 ( 2 ) w a s i n t e n d e d t 0 
which the trade mark is registered"
 p r o v i d e a w i d e s c o p e o f p r o t e c t i o n a n d that the 
provided there exists "a likelihood of confusion ... definition of "similar goods" should be a broad one. 
which includes the likelihood of association with the His Lordship found that his conclusion on similarity 
trade mark". of goods was supported by the recitals to the EC 
In the British Sugar case,30 Jacob J rejected the Directive, under which the issue of similarity is 
plaintiff's argument that if there is confusion then there separated in the recitals from the question of confusion. 
must be similarity of goods because the product may He considered that the recital which states: 
be used for identical purposes: , . ,. 
"Whereas it is indispensable to give an 
"The sub-section does not merely ask 'will there interpretation ofthe concept of similarity in relation 
be confusion?': it asks Ms there similarity of to the likelihood of confusion" 
goods?', if so, 'is there any likelihood of 
confusion?'. The point is important. For if one d o e s n o m o r e t h a n s t a t e t h a t i n assessing similarity 
elides the two questions then a'strong'mark would
 u u
 ΛΛ
 _ . - J + U i - *+u„++uÄ~ ™^~ 
A . \ ? , * one should bear in mind the fact that the purpose get protection for a greater range of goods than a _ . . , , . . , ,
 Ί
. . . f \ , , _ . &
x
 *v J ι » r ι to be considered is trade mark purposes. It is not 
weak mark. For instance, Kodak for socks or .
 A , . ., .r*i . r . 
u
. , · u. u r · * .u saying that goods are similar if there is confusion, bicycles might well cause confusion, yet these _. _ A> · ·ι *u A u TU +-
\ ι · ι j - · ·ι xv r-, no matter how dissimilar the goods may be. That is 
goods are plainly dissimilar from films or cameras. ,_ _ A^. C~>\ , u· Z · *u ¿ · .r 7*u· wu J r · ·ι ·*. r A u u a matter for Art 5(2) (which is the basis of our I think the question of similarity of goods is wholly „31 
27 [1996] FSR 205. ~ 
28 Ibid at 215. 31 The judge noted obiter that the circumstances of the Dutch 
29 The judge relied upon the case of Morny Limited s Trade case Claeryn/Klarein, 1.3.1975 NJ 1975, 472 may fall within s 
Marks ( 1951 ) 68 RPC 131, decided under the 1938 Trade Marks 10(3) but would not fall within s 10(2) because there would be no 
Act. likelihood of confusion as to trade origin (and in this context cited 
30 Unreported, ChD, 7 February 1996. Wagamama ν City Centre Restaurants [1995] FSR 173). 
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His Lordship then proceeded to consider the (a) the respective uses of the respective goods or 
question of similarity. First of all, he noted that the services; 
wider the scope of similarity, the wider the protection (b) the respective users ofthe respective goods or 
given to the mark would be: services; 
,,r-,.
 A . _- . , (c) the physical nature ofthe goods or acts of service; This suggests caution. Otherwise, however narrow ;,; ^_ .. __ _ _ , .,
 u
 w u+u 
•r· χ- .ι- 4. ι 1- -m- -J (d) the respective trade channels through which the 
a specification, the actual protection will be wide. , r .
 u Λ AU λ . 
T
 r
 . , ' , . / . - . goods or services reached the market; In particular, this would be so m the important sort ,
 x
 f
 Al_ r i r .. u 
~
r
 ' , ,
 r
 . (e) in the case of self-serve consumer items, wherein 
of case where a mark owner only got registration .
 Λ
 .. , ,, ,
 r i , . 
. . . r.
 A , ,. A. .. r. practice they are respectively found or likely to on the basis of actual distinctiveness for a narrow J_
 r
 ,. , . ,. .. ,
 u
 ,
u 
,
 τ
 ,, , , , be found in supermarkets and m particular whether 
class of goods. It would surely be wrong that he
 A, 1M , . _ ~ A .u 
. . , . . - * · J they are, or are likely to be, found on the same or 
should then in practice get protection for a wide . ., , , / 
_ _ τ_ x j χ χ- _ similar shelves; and 
range of goods. If aman wants wide protection he
 /jrv A, A x x ,. , 4 , A. , 
,
 &
 . - . , .,i xx ι -ci.· ι · (0 the extent to which the respective goods or services 
can always ask for it and will get it only if his claim . .
 A . ./. χ χ χ · Λ ι χ 
. . .~ ,
 T J , . , , . j . r. are competitive and m this context it is useful to is justified ... I do not think the introduction of -_ _ ι χ u ι A 
. ; . r . . . i j i 1 - j j consider how market research companies classify infringement for similar goods has vastly widened
 Λ
 4^. , , - 3 3 
.
 ö
 ,, . ι x χ. „ the particular goods or services.J the scope of potential protection. 
. . . . . . . . J 1 However, his Lordship accepted that such a list 
It is interesting in this context to consider the case .,
 A, , .. , - ! J _ Ä 
^ 1 , ,^ » « L u^ χ „ x j could not be exhaustive and was for general guidance 
of Mars ν Cadbury,32 where Tveets was registered . , IHd-
by the plaintiffs for chocolate flavoured confectionery, 
because it was only in relation to such a limited class "The fact is that the Directive and hence our Act 
of goods that the plaintiff had been able to persuade has introduced an area of uncertainty into the scope 
the Registrar that it had sufficient use to justify of registration which in many cases can only be 
protection for such a quasi-descriptive mark. Such a resolved by litigation." 
case highlights the dangers of which Jacob J warns: if ~
 Al_ __. , _ . rr_ _ ? u . . u 
&
 * .
 s
. ,
 ur
_ „ , On the particular facts ofthe case before him, the 
the actual protection given to the Treets mark . . ., , ,, ,
 AU , , , u A.u „_Λ 
, / , ,
 Λ
 Λ c- . iudge considered that the two products had the same 
registered for chocolate flavoured confectionery was ° x x u x - x u · u A A-CC 
* . I J 1 I - , . · ι. f use to some extent but in the mam had different uses; wide, there would be little point in ever seeking a broad
 A, A „ . A. . .... ,., 
._. . ^ υ - A^ ^ * they were not generally in direct competition and they 
specification. One could avoid the problems of non- ,, , _
 Λ
 . ,.— . , . , , 
, , , . . . ^ U J could be found in different places in supermarkets; 
usebyonlyhavrngarepstrationmanarrowfieldand
 t h e i h y s i c a l n a t u r e w a s d i f f e r e n t i n t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f F s AuT T d aCqU,re Pr0teCtl0n ° V e r a pr0duCt WaS p0Ured WhÜSt the defe dant's needed t0 
W1 e r f | n S e o g ° ° S'i . ι be spooned out ofthe jar; and market research regarded 
Whilst accepting that there was no intention in the _ _ _
 A r „. -a.· J.·«· 
/ °
 A „u , _ , the two products as falling within different sectors, new Act to adopt the concept of goods ofthe same ^ ^ ¿ ·
 f i L
 Γ
 , . , .
 + u 
. . _. „
 K
, . ,
 1 Λ Ο ο Λ χ f ι. , j j On the basis of these factors taken together, it was description" used in the 1938 Act, Jacob J considered
 Γ
 , ^_ ^  ^,
 A ~ A ., , . . ., . 
th . found that the defendant s spread was not similar to 
the plaintifFs dessert sauces and syrups, 
"the purpose ofthe conception in the old Act was 
to prevent marks from conflicting not only for their Likelihood of association 
respective actual goods but for a penumbra and the
 T h e n o t i o n o f « l i k e l i h o o d 0 f confusion" is one which 
purpose ot similar goods in the Directive and Act
 ¡g f a m ¡ H a r t 0 t r a d e m a r k p r a c t i t i o n e r s i n t h e U n i t e d 
is to provide protection and separation for a similar
 K i n g d o m ? especially in passing off actions. It is the 
sort of penumbra."
 r e a s o n w h y for SQ m a n y y e a r s t h e p a s s i n g o f f a c t i o n 
In making such an assessment, the judge suggested 
that the following factors would be relevant:
 3 3 w i t h t n e exception of (e) and (f), these factors are those 
identified by Romer J in Jellinek 63 RPC 59 at 70 to be used in 
~ ascertaining what were "goods ofthe same description" under the 
32 [1987] RPC 387. Trade Marks Act 1938. 
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was bedevilled by an apparent requirement for "a Member States changed to that already adopted by 
common field of activity". Even though this was the Benelux countries is open to question ... It 
categorically stated not to be a requirement in the would be wrong to approach construction of the 
Advocaat decision ofthe House of Lords,34 it remains 1988 Directive and the 1994 Act on unverifiable 
an essential element in proving passing off in practice: rumours or Professor Gielen's certainty as to what 
if there is no confusion, or there is unlikely to be was intended."38 
confusion, there can be no damage. But, if the
 T , . · In his view* 
evidential burden in infringement actions falling under 
s 10(2) is going to be similar to those in a passing off "There are two possible constructions which may 
action, what do the words "includes the likelihood of be placed on Art 5 ofthe 1988 Directive and s 10(2) 
association" mean? Are they merely a subset of "a ofthe 1994 Act. The rights ofthe proprietor against 
likelihood of confusion" or do they go further? alleged infringers may be limited to classic 
There is no definitive answer. The EC Directive does infringement which includes association as to origin 
not assist, as United Kingdom law has merely adopted or, following the Benelux route, it could cover not 
the wording of Art 5(l)(b). However, Gielen35has only classic infringement but also non-origin 
pointed out that a confidential EC Council Minute association. In my view, the former construction is 
records that the concept of "association" has been to be preferred. If the broader scope were to be 
developed in particular under Benelux law which has adopted, the Directive and our Act would be 
had it since 1970. Benelux case law does not require creating a new type of monopoly not related to the 
confusion in order for a finding of "association" and proprietor's trade but in the trade mark itself. Such 
Gielen contends that the Minute a monopoly could be likened to a quasi-copyright 
. , , , . , in the mark. However, unlike copyright, there would 
"can certainly be used to say that the words , ~ , , ,.
 c
 .
u
 .
 u
.
 A.. , , , n 
e l M 1M j / . . , . . _ n , be no fixed duration for the right and it would be a likelihood of association originate from Benelux ^ , ~ .. . . _ ·0χ n„A „„„ 
A , , , j , , . . true monopoly effective against copyist and non-trade mark law and that there is more sense in .
 A ,., T .,. . Λ . „ Λ ^ ι . Λ 
, . , , . . . i . j j T ^ i copyist alike. I can see nothmg in the terms ofthe 
studying how this notion is applied under Benelux
 n
. ,. ,
 A *\ · ~ ,*Α~,~*«+Α..;Αι 
,
 &
 . . - I J ^ ι Directive (or our Act), or in any secondary material 
law than there is, for example, under German law, , . ,
 T , , , ... . , , Λ .. . u . u 
' , \ \ .
 t ,. _ ' which I could legitimately take into account, which 
where this concept also exists but with a different υ ι j T xu· -u u· ^i
 Λ 
. „
 36
 K
 would lead me to assume this was the objective. 
meaning . On the contrary, the preamble to the Directive seems 
On the other hand, the actual wording of s 10(2) to point in the opposite direction since it states: 
(and Art 5(l)(b)) clearly requires a "likelihood of 'Whereas the protection offended by the 
confusion" in all cases and "likelihood of association" registered trade mark, the function of which is in 
is included expressly as one of a number of particular to guarantee the trade mark as an 
circumstances which are likely to lead to confusion. indication of origin.' 
On this issue of "likelihood of association", Laddie J _
 Λ
 ,, . , ,..., 
. , . , , , . , .
 TTr ' „ Furthermore, there appears to be little 
in his landmark judgment in Wagamama ν City Centre .
 Λ
.
 Α
.Λ- .· η „ « i ,
a
vw;
r t n«f 
r r f j j i commercial justification for any such extension of 
Restaurants37 concluded that: . , , . ,. „..
 UnA u _ Λ Α :„+_„+· „ +/Λ 
trade mark rights. If it had been the intention to 
"It appears to me that any popular belief, fuelled make the Directive identical with Benelux law on 
by articles in legal publications, that Art 5 ofthe this important issue it could have said so. Indeed, 
1988 Directive was intended to ensure that the in view ofthe fact that to have done so would have 
domestic law of trade mark infringement in all been significantly to expand trade mark rights and 
thereby significantly restrict the freedom of 
34 Erven Warnink BVvJ Townend & Sons (Hull) Ltd [1979] Competitors to Compete, I would have expected any 
AC 731. such expansion to have been stated in clear and 
35 Gielen, European Trade Mark Legislation: the Statements unambiguous words SO that traders throughout the 
(1996) 18 (No 2) EIPR 83. & 
36 Ibid at 87. " 
37 [1995] FSR 713. 38 Ibid at 728. 
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European Union would be able to appreciate that Margarine42) which are protected in England: it is not 
their legislators had created a new broad monopoly. something as ephemeral as a "reputation" if there has 
As it is, no such clear and unambiguous words have been no business activity within the jurisdiction. 
been used and the language of the Directive and Similarly, United Kingdom law on the registration 
the 1994 Act is consistent with the rights being of trade marks has not required use of a mark before 
restricted to classical infringement."39 registration can be obtained: there is absolutely no need 
Tx · J x^ · ix χ i_ · J χ · J · .L for P r i o r u s e i n o r d e r to obtain a registration. An It is difficult to see how a iudge trained in the .
 A . , , re- Α Α ι 
. , ,
 b
 intention to use has always sufficed and, as long as 
common law tradition could have come to any . . . . . .
 f r . . .. xu xu xu x u A u τ Jj- τ xi/ there has been use within five years of registration, 
conclusion other than that reached by Laddie J: the , . , , . -
wording ofs 10(2) (and of Art 5(1 )(b) of the Directive)
 l i r L i 4 L · « χ χ· · *u τ τ ·• Α ν Λ "O 
. ,
 6
. .
 f
v JK
 . „,.,,., j _ What then is a "reputation m the United Kingdom"? is clear m its language as it expresses likelihood of ^_
 A, , _ . c o,u Λ 
. . „ . , · ., . , Of course, there must be some sort of use ofthe mark; 
association as a particular circumstance within the
 J / / n , x ._ r .. c . . .. .# 
. r.«i-i i-u A r A · „ ^ xu . i s 46(l)(a) pro vides for revocation of a registration if 
concept of likelihood of confusion . On the actual ^ ¿ _ _ « · · *u τ τ ·• A 
.? , , , , , there has not been "genuine use in the United 
wording, to suggest otherwise would be to adopt the
 T_. , „ r . , r^- «*·ΛπΛ · . *u~ 
_
 &
' . * „ _ . „ ! ,AX- A r- A Kingdom" for a period of five years "following the 
tortuous reasoning that confusion should be defined
 Λ
 . c ι J * *u · *,.„+;„~ -*.„„
Λ
Λ„*.-» 
. , , „ . . „ . j υ date of completion of the registration procedure 
to include "association ; m other words, one would
 f , . u J . , . *·,™ι:„ο*™ ;ç^u_^^u J ^ 1 1 1 . , ,. , . , . (which must mean the date of application ifthe mark 
need to define black as including white, a conclusion : - ^ J ΛΠ/^W 
uu- A-er u+ 4. -4-u 4. ι AA- ι -4. is registered, see s 40(3)). 
which is difficult to accept without, as Laddie J points
 n
 ° , , . . , . __*_ . U_„_K+ 
F
 ' , „ ^ 1 1 But how much use is required in order to benefit 
out, an unambiguous statement to that effect and the _
 1 Λ η λ 0 T4. ,, , . ,,, u ^ „o^ 
^. ' .
 &
. . . from s 10(3)? It would surely not merely be use 
Directive contains one in neither its terms nor its « .
 4 4 A ^ 1 „n4.- „„+i™ 
. , sufficient to prevent a successful revocation action 
recitili^» 
under s 46: it must be something more, but how much 
n
 _ . . - TT ._
 JVr. ι more? Presumably, the more use, the more likely it is 
Reputation m the United Kingdom
 a c o u r t w¡1] f m d t h i r d p a r t y u s e t o b e d e t r i m e n t a l t 0 
Section 10(3) gives a remedy to the owner of a the distinctive character or repute ofthe registered 
registered trade mark if there is use of an identical or mark. Up until now all marks have had to be distinctive, 
similar mark in relation to goods to services which are so "distinctive character or repute" must mean 
not similar to those for which the trade mark has been something more than merely being capable of being 
registered. However, there is only infringement ifthe registered as trade mark: Yet it cannot be so distinctive 
registered mark "has a reputation in the United as to be "well known" within the meaning of Art 6 bis 
Kingdom" and the use takes unfair advantage of or is ofthe Paris Convention43 because s 56 deals with such 
detrimental to the distinctive character or repute of well-known or famous marks and, although the owner 
the registered mark. ofa "well known" mark failing within Art 6 bis could 
The notion of "reputation" is one with which the avail himself of s 10(3) if it is registered in the United 
English courts have had difficulty: the law of passing Kingdom, the international character of the mark to 
off protects goodwill, it does not protect reputation. be protected by Art 6 bis makes it inconceivable that 
As Walton J in the Athlete's Foot case40 so clearly "reputation in the UK" can be equated with "well 
analysed, a "reputation" is something which English known" for the purposes of Art 6 bis and s 56. 
law has not protected: since the seminal decision of It is in this area that continental notions of 
the House of Lords in A G Spalding & Bros ν AW "notoriety" maybe imported into United Kingdom law. 
Qamage Ltd4] it has been firmly established that it is The percentages of awareness by the relevant public 
custom and sales ("the attractive force which brings required for a mark to be found to be one of notoriety, 
in custom" per Lord MacNaughton in IRC ν Mullers as evidenced by either party-conducted or court-
conducted market surveys, may become critical. 
39 Ibid at 731. ~ 
40 Athlete's Foot Marketing Associates ine ν Cobra Sports 42 [1901] AC 217. 
[ 1980] RPC 343. 43 See, for example, United Biscuits ν Burtons Biscuits [ 1992] 
41 (1915) 32 RPC 273. FSR 14, in which the surveys were found to be of no value. 
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But both academic literature and common sense to be confused into thinking that the name 'Opus' 
suggest that surveying the public is an inexact science. indicates that this is a publication by the plaintiff 
It remains extremely doubtful whether English judges 
at least will arrogate to market survey organisations, At the other end of the scale there is a person 
no matter how independent, their right to conclude that who just looks at the outside and does not bother 
a mark is "distinctive" or not.44 Indeed, can a mark be to go any further. I do not regard such a person as 
"distinctive" with only insignificant use or even of any relevance because the impression made upon 
extensive pre-launch publicity in the United Kingdom: his or her mind by the process envisaged is 
analyses in passing off actions would suggest that this necessarily so slight that it would not produce any 
is possible.45 significant confusion and also because I am 
In the only judgment to date dealing with s 10(3), unpersuaded that it would be right for the court to 
BASFpIc ν CEP (UK) pic,46 the judge held that there h a v e r e ê a r d t 0 t h e reactions of such an inattentive 
was no arguable case of a relevant detriment in reader.' 
circumstances where the evidence did not disclose
 I n t h e absence of evidence of relevant confusion, 
confusion. In the case, the second plaintiff was the the judge considered that there was no basis for finding 
registered proprietor ofthe mark "Opus" for inter alia
 t h a t u n f a i r advantage had been taken or threatened to 
herbicides and fungicides and the defendants had be taken, contrary to s 10(3). In rejecting the arguments 
announced an intention to distribute a new publication by C0Unsel for the plaintiffs, the judge stated forcefully: 
under the title "Farming Opus", to be distributed free 
of charge to 25,000 of the largest arable and dairy " U n l e s s [t w a s P o s s i b l e t 0 c l a i m t h a t a n ^ u s e ° f t h e 
farmers in the country. plaintiff's mark in relation to any class of goods at 
In the judge's view a11' w h e n s o l d t 0 P e r s o n s w h o a l s o d e a l W l t h t h e 
plaintiff in the goods or class in relation to which 
"The evidence shows that those who pay any there is statutory protection for the plaintiff's mark, 
significant degree of attention to what is written in was of itself necessarily detrimental to the 
the promotional literature or the finished product distinctive character or repute of the plaintiff's 
cannot fail to see what the defendant's goods in mark, I am unable to see how in the case before the 
fact are: that is to say, a director of agricultural court there can be any such detrimental effect within 
goods and services covering a very wide field both the meaning of s 10(3). If the protection given by 
in terms of goods and services and in terms of their s 10(3) went that far, much ofthe effect of having 
providers (the advertisers) even a cursory classes of goods in relation to the registration of 
inspection shows that both arable, dairy and general trade marks would disappear ... Neither the 
farming is covered and the numerous suppliers, distinctive character nor the repute of the plaintiff's 
many in direct competition with each other, are mark is adversely affected when there is no risk of 
included. Once the reader appreciates those not very relevant confusion." 
subtle facts, he or she will not, in my view, be likely ^1 . , . . n .^  A _ . , , 
J J
 This decision, albeit at the interlocutory stage, 
highlights the unwillingness of certain English judges 
44 See, for example, imperial Group pic ν Philip Morris Ltd to accept the argument that the new Act has expanded 
[1984] RPC 293, in which Whitford J stated: "Great importance
 ft s e o f p r o t e c t i o n for a registered mark beyond 
inevitably attaches to the way in which the questions are cast. It is r r o 
very difficult in connection with an exercise such as this to think those circumstances where confusion has resulted or 
of questions which, even if they are free from the objection of is likely to. On the other hand, in British Sugar41Jacob J 
being leading, are not in fact going to direct the person answering
 a p p e a r e d to accept that it would be possible for t rade 
the question into a field oí speculation upon which that person , . „ . . . . , 
would never have embarked had the question not been put." (At m a r k infringement to arise in circumstances where 
303.) there was no relevant confusion when he cited the 
45 For example, BBC ν Talbot Motor Co [1980] FSR 228, in Claeiyn/Klarein judgment in the Benelux. However, 
which extensive pre-launch advertising was held to be sufficient · 
to found an action for passing off (although it is suggested that the 
judgment was founded on a misunderstanding of earlier decisions). 
46Unreported, ChD, Knox J, 26 October 1995. 47 Unreported, ChD, 7 February 1996. 
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it seems likely that it is only the unusual case, where which was introduced into the 1938 Act to try and 
there is a clear danger ofa negative association between deal with comparative advertising (at that time a 
the plaintiff's mark and the defendant's (such as the relatively rare phenomenon), was described as being 
unpleasant association of detergent with gin, as in "fuliginous in its obscurity".50 It reflected a distaste 
Claeryn) where the lack of confusion will be able to for comparative advertising which is still present in 
surmount it certain countries' laws (such as the law against unfair 
competition in Germany).51 
Well-known marks But s 10(6) does not excuse use in relation to genuine 
A , , , , Λ Λ * χ , TT . , goods or services "otherwise than in accordance with 
At long last (over 100 years late), the United
 h o n e s t i c e s ¡n i n d u s t r i a l o f c o m m e r c i a l m a t t e r s „ 
Kingdom has provided specific protection in s 56 of . f s u c h u g e ^ u n f a i r ^ m ^ d e t r i m e n t a l t 0 
the 1994 Act for marks entitled to protection under ,, ,.
 A. ,. u , *.* . A , 
A , , . , . ,
 Λ
 . ^ „η , , the distinctive character or repute ofthe trade marks. 
Art 6 bis ofthe Pans Convention. Where such a mark ~_ .r¿_ · tí
 Γ
 · ,, .- A ^- · ^ 
.
 Lí ,„ ,, . . , . , τ τ . ,τ,, ι Thus, if there is "unfair' comparative advertising (for 
is well known or famous withm the United Kmgdom, , , .
 i t , j f t _ f t û P % P ; n . u 
, . ,
 Λ
 .
 t l .
 &
 example, by comparing apples and oranges as m the 
even though it has not been reg.stered here, its owner
 v D g / / 52 o r m h ^ u g e o f fe,se 
.sgiVenthenghttoobtainaniiyuncUontorestrainthe
 s t a t e m e n t s ) t h a t w o u l d n o t b e ¡„ a c c o r d a n c e w i t h 
use m the United Kingdom of the identical or a similar _ , , , . , „
Λ ί
.
Λ
, .
Λ
 „+;+,^
 o r
, 
, .
 &
 ., . , . ., , honest practices and would therefore constitute an 
mark used in relation to identical or similar goods or .
 r
 . ,
 T f . , . ,, _ Λ Λ 1 . _ „ , , ~A 
_, , . · , „ . , , . ; , η infringement. If that is the case, courts may find 
services. The only requirement is likelihood of
 1 V . , , . . , ., _ · . _ n«™„ T U Û I ; I ra 
„ . „ , , . ; . M , . , , litigants seeking to drag them into an arena they have 
confusion (which is not expressed to include a
 b e e n u n w i l l i n g t o e n t e r : t h e a r e n a o f d e c i d i n g b e t w e e n 
likelihood of association). competing claims for products. A way out may be to 
Use >n good faith prior to the commencement ofthe ^ ^
 i r e m e n t t h a t ¡t ¡s t h e d i s t i n c t i v e c h a r a c t e r 
1994 Act is not affected by this new right.«
 o r o f ^ ^ ^ ( n o t o f fte t r a d e ) m a t ¡ s 
Inessence^hesectionamstoproVidetheprotection
 o t e c t e d : c o m p a r i s o n o f t h e p r 0 p e r t i e s 0f the goods 
for well-known marks which it was intended that the
 e r ¡ n a c c u r a t e ) d o e s n o t a t t a c k t h e m a r k i t s e l f . 
defensive use provisions ofthe 1938 Act would ^, ^
 r , , _ n . .
 Λ
 „ J , , ^ : ™ „ 
,T1 „ , . . The English case law on comparative advertising 
provide. They did not because of extremely restrictive
 a r i s e s ¡n t r a d e H b d a s w e ] , a g r e g i s t e r e d t f a d e 
mterpretations by the courts of their meaning.« It is to
 m a r k s u n d e r g , ( b ) o f ^ j 9 3 g A a ) h a s s h o w n ^ 
be hoped that s 56 will be applied by English courts to ^
 r , . ,. . . ·, _ . _ .·. · M r» „„53 
,. , , , „ . , , . . /
 T T . , „ . , English judiciary at its most pragmatic: in De Beers'" 
eradicate the bad faith adoption m the United Kingdom ...
 u
 τ
 χ
 A4. u~r~ ^UnffU^^nn«,^ 
, . ^ ,
 &
 , . Walton J was not prepared to believe that the consumer 
of a mark well known in one category but not used m .„ , , .
 + u _ , . ,· , „„ . · ^ „ 0 
.
 ¥T . 1 T , . , , . ^ , . , will believe even the most ridiculous claim tor a 
the United Kingdom on the goods in respect of which , ,
 i r ,, . u , , +1 „Λ· χ;«„ 
,, ? · , & K product. If, on the other hand, an apparently scientific 
it is used by a third party.
 d a i m w a g b e ¡ n g m a d ^ ^ m a k e r m u s t s t a n d b y ¡t a n d 
^ , . ζ . not say "I didn't really mean it". Presumably, if an 
Genuine goods or services/comparative
 scientif íc d a i m is s h o w n t0 b e wrong? t he 
advertising 
Section 10(6) excludes from the infringement 
nmvkinnQ anv HQP nf a rpaktprprl rraHp mark hv a third 5 0 P e r M a c k i n n o n L J i n Bismag ν Amblins 57 RPC 209. 
provisions any use ot a registered trade mark by a third
 5 1 S e e t h e r e c e n t e x a m p l e i n F r a n c e 5 Société [es 3 Suisses v La 
party "for the ρ υ φ 0 5 β of identifying goods or services Redoute (Douai Court of Appeal, 2 October 1995, reported (1996) 
as those ofthe proprietor or a licensee". This is similar 18 (No 1 ) EIPR D-68). The particular delivery times ofthe plaintiff 
χ / i n v \ c4-u i m o A χ u * 4-u · · · and defendant mail order firms were emphasised in the plaintiff's 
to s 4(3)(a) ofthe 1938 Act but there is no provision
 c o m p a r a t i v e a d v e r t i s i n g 5 i n a d d i t i o n t 0 £ e fact that the plaintiff's 
on the lines o f t h e much-crit icised s 4(1 )(b) and its service was free but did not mention that the defendant's was also. 
prohibit ion of " import ing a reference". That provision, As Logeais (at D-69) comments: "Henceforth, advertising which 
uses an over-subtle comparison between the products concerned 
runs the risk of being penalised both for being misleading and also, since it quotes a rival product, for abusive competition by 48 Section 46(3). denigration or para itism." 9 e Kerfys Law of Trade Marks and Trade Names ( 12th ed, 52 [1992] FSR 93.Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1986), par 8-82. 53 [1979] FSR 72. 158 AUSTRALIAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY JOURNAL — Volume 7
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use of another's registered trade mark in such a claim In the British Sugar55 case, Jacob J commented on 
would not be in accordance with honest practices and s 11(2) as it applies to comparative advertising: 
would therefore constitute trade mark infringement. „,
 s e e n o
 ^
n w h ^ i s i o n d o e s n o t p e r m i t 
As stated clearly by Laddie J in Barclays Bank ν
 a fejr n s m b e t w e e n t h e t r a d e m a r k o w n e r > s 
RBSAdvanta54 a major objective ofs 10(6) is to allow
 g o o d s a n d t h o s e o f fte d e f e n d a n t T h e comparison 
comparative advertising:
 h a d t Q b e h o n e s t ? b u t p r o v i d e d ¡t w a s a n d w a s p a r t 
"As long as the use ofthe competitor's mark is ofthe genuine indication of, for instance, quality 
'honest' then there is nothing wrong with telling or price, I think it would be within the provision, 
the public ofthe relative merits of competing goods Such honest comparative use might well upset the 
and services and using registered trade marks to mark's proprietor (proprietors particularly do not 
identify them." n k e price comparisons, even if they are true) but 
would in no way affect his mark as an indication of 
The proviso, that such use must be in accordance with
 t r a d e o r i g i n indeed the defendant would be using 
honest practices, should not be construed in such a
 t h e proprietor's mark precisely for its proper 
way as to effectively prohibit all comparative purpose, namely to refer to his goods. I can see 
advertising: nothing in the stated purpose of the Directive 
"Ifthe use is considered honest by members ofa indicating that a trade mark monopoly should 
reasonable audience, it will not infringe. The fact e x t e n d t 0 t h e P o i n t o f e n a b l m ê a proprietor to 
that the advertising pokes fun at the proprietors' suppress^competition by use of his trade mark m 
goods or services and emphasises the benefits of w a^· 
the defendant's is a normal incidence of It can thus be seen that the United Kingdom courts 
comparative advertising. Its aim will be to divert are going to be extremely unwilling to prohibit the 
customers from the proprietor. TsIo reasonable comparative use ofa registered trade mark unless there 
observer would expect one trader to point to all the are compelling reasons to find such use "not in 
advantages of its competitor's business and failure accordance with honest practices", 
to do so does not per se take the advertising outside 
what reasonable people would regard as 'honest'. Conclusion 
Thus, mere trade puffery, even if uncomfortable to . . .
 r . .r 
.u - x j · * A 4. u - 4-u Some of the recent criticism ot the Wagamama™ 
the registered proprietor, does not bring the . „ , , „ . , _ *
 % A 4.- - -.u- 4-u e 4. Α ι decision of Laddie J and the British Sugar1 judgment 
advertising within the scope of trade mark , , , . . , f , . , , 
. η. °
 ΛΑ
 , , ,. · . . , of Jacob J has been misconceived and short-sighted, intnngement. Much advertising copy is recognised . . , 
u *u Ui- u u ι ru A xj χ· Expectations of trade mark owners and, to a large by the public as hyperbole. The Act does not impose , . , . ,
 A · x· r ^ · 
+u , Ui- ,· x x A c extent, their advisers that the Approximation Directive on the courts an obligation to try and enforce, , '
 1 Λ Λ „ _ . w . Á . . , ,, . 4-u u 4-u u ι A r 4. Α ι ι · ι . · (and the 1994 Trade Marks Act) would result in a through the back door of trade mark legislation, a . ._. , , ·
 f i L χ χ· ι ix 
ν · ι χ J J .χ· xi xi ι J significant broadening of the protection accorded to puritanical standard. If, on the other hand, any „ . , , , , .. .. r
 . . , . , . , , , · · all registered trade marks have been unrealistic, 
reasonable reader is likely to say, on being given
 Λ Λ 7 1 P 1 A, A , , , . . 
,
 r
 .. . , ,
 λ
.
:
. , What both trade mark owners and users require is a 
the tuli facts, that the advertisement is not honest, , ,
 A , . , . . .u , ν · _ . · χΛ^ Λ„χ„ 
. . . .- , . , ,. coherent system which protects the legitimate interests 
for example because it is significantly misleading,
 o f fte Q ^.^ ¡s¡ t h a t t 0 0 b r o a d a s c o p e 
then the protection for trade mark infringement is
 Q f p r o t e c t i o n i s an t i .competitive. It is in that context 
remove .
 t b a t m e j u ( j g m e n t s 0f Laddie J and Jacob J are to be 
As noted by Laddie J, s 10(6) is "home-grown" and welcomed: they both indicate that the courts in the 
is not based either on the Directive or on the Paris United Kingdom are not (until instructed otherwise 
Convention, neither of which specifically permits by the European Court of Justice) going to turn the 
comparative advertising. 
55 Unreported, ChD, 7 February 1996. 
56 [1995] FSR 713. 
54 Unreported, ChD, 26 January 1996. 57 Unreported, ChD, 7 February 1996. 
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law of registered trade marks into a statutory law of advantage" or "detriment" will be found if there is 
unfair competition. confusion. It will only be in the exceptional case that 
This is not to say that the new Act does not have the undue advantage or detriment would be found if there 
effect of increasing the importance of registered trade has been or is likely to be no confusion; the obvious 
marks but rather that there has been introduced a example cited by Jacob J in British Sugar being the 
hierarchy of such registered marks and a differentiated Dutch Claeryn/Klar ein type of case in which the 
scope of protection, depending on which level in the patently negative association between the two products 
hierarchy the particular mark (and the alleged would be detrimental, 
infringement) lies. Clearly it is one ofthe intentions ofthe new system 
The expansive notions of trade mark infringement
 t h a t ¡ t ¡ s e a s i e r t 0 o b t a i n r egi stered marks but 
present in Benelux law have been firmly rejected as
 Wagamama, British Sugar and BASF show that it is 
far as s 10(2) is concerned: confusion (or at the
 n o t all registered marks which are going to benefit from 
interlocutory stage the likelihood of it) remains ^
 m u c h b r o a d e r s c o p e o f p r o t e c t i o n a v a i i a b l e : i f a 
essential.Indeer4ontheactualwordingoftheDirecti^
 m a r R h a s b e e n u s e d o n a s i m f l c a n t s c a l e 5 t h e 
and Act it is difficult to argue otherwise, unless one is
 x A. , , , ., . ., , , u . .. . . 
, , _. . . . . , ?. , . «, ·, i-i A r protection accorded to it is considerable, but it is not 
to define black as including white. Likelihood of r
 r . . . _ r ^ ,. 
η . . , ,. , , , · , , r - χ · . , , an unfair competition type ot protection, 
confusion, including likelihood of association must
 4 . , · , · χ- ι · xu * « - χ · » · u 4- e« f · „ ^ A newly registered or quasi-descriptive mark is not 
mean that association is a subset of confusion .To , . , , , - , · , 
argue otherwise requires linguistic gymnastics and, as § ο ι η § t 0 b e § l v e n t h e b r o a d Ρ™**™ which requires 
Laddie J in Wagamama so forcefully pointed out, if " a reputation in the UK' (and therefore presumably 
there was an intention to require such an interpretation significant use). From a policy perspective, this must 
it would surely have been expressly stated. s u r e l y b e c o r r e c t I n t h a t c o n t e x t ' t h e d e c i s l o n i n B n t l s h 
The best, if not only persuasive argument, against Sugar, although at first sight surprising, is eminently 
the Laddie view is that it would be illogical to require sensible: the analysis of "similar goods" should be a 
confusion in the context of s 10(2) and not in s 10(3): restricted one because otherwise an unrealistic burden 
if "similar infringement" requires confusion, then will be placed on the Registry when examining 
surely so must "dissimilar" infringement. However, this applications under s 5(2) (the corollary ofs 10(2) 
presupposes that s 10(3) infringement does not require dealing with relative grounds for refusal of 
confusion in all but the exceptional case and in registration). 
constructing a coherent hierarchy of infringements such Of course, there can be no definitive view on the 
a proposition is questionable. meaning of the infringement provisions until the 
As can be seen from the interlocutory decision in European Court of Justice has given its views on the 
BASF,5* if a case is brought under s 10(3) "undue difficult issues and there are pending before that court 
at least two references on the meaning of "likelihood 
58 Unreported, ChD, Knox J, 26 October 1995. of associat ion". 
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